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CHANGING DYNAMICS OF JAPANESE
RELATIONS WITH AFRICA

Rebecca Spyke, University of South Carolina

Introduction
Relations between Japan and African nations have never been
close.' Various factors account for the lack of interaction between the
two areas, including geographical distance, cultural differences, and
Japan and Africa's particular relationships with the powers ofEurope and
the United States. Yet, interactions between African states and Japan
have existed since World War II. Relations between Japan and Africa
have been shaped by three main factors: first, the influence of the major
colonial and Cold War powers on Japan and Africa; second, Japan's
world view, which spurred the nation to become a major superpower
through nonmilitary means, and, third, Japan's view of itself as a
nonwhite power which has through its strength overcome the adversity of
a hostile world system and therefore has little understanding of those
countries of Black Africa that have remained in the world's periphery.
This article will explore how these factors have formed Japan-Africa
relations during the late 1960's, when Japan experienced an incredible
economic boom, and the early 1970's when Japan's world goals and
strategies were altered by the two oil shocks during this period.
Previous examinations of Japan-Africa relations are extremely
few in number and have focused mainly on the changes in Japanese trade
and aid policies towards Africa. For instance, Ichiro Inukai discusses
how after the oil crises in 1974 Japan began to increase the amount of aid
given to Africa.2 Inukai explains that aid is given to Africa for two main
reasons. First, Japan gives aid in return for vitally needed natural
resources and commodities. Second, there is a true humanitarian spirit
still alive in Japan, and Japan often gives aid to Africa in order._to help
alleviate poverty and the problems caused by violence. Yet, both the
influence of the pressure placed on Japan by the United States to more
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actively participate in world affairs and the influence of Japan's particular
world view on its aid policy are not specifically discussed . S. Olu Agbi
focuses mainly on trade and aid relations between Japan and Africa
because , as he explains , other types of relations , such as diplomatic and
political, have been extremely limited. Agbi does show that often these
economic relations are political in nature because they are given in order
to help secure needed natural resources and commodities to help maintain
Japan ' s powerful position in the world. 3 However , Agbi does not delve
specifically into how the international political, economic, and social
context have affected Japan's aid to and trade with Africa .
Recent books and articles published by Japanese academics have
criticized Japan ' s Africa policy, saying that, although Japan has greatly
increased the amount of foreign aid in recent years, the assistance is given
in the context of a lack of a proactive set of goals. Therefore, the purpose
of foreign aid and of Japan ' s Africa policy in general remains undefined
and relations remain distant. Kazuyoshi Aoki says that Japan ' s policy
towards Africa fits into a fifty-year pattern of a Japanese foreign policy
based on trial and error rather than on specifically defined goals. 4 Hideo
Oda also points out that, although consciousness of African problems has
increased in Japan since the 1980's, Japan ' s Africa policy is not
specifically stated . This vagueness, Oda states, may be due to Japan's
fear of becoming increasingly active in Africa after the criticism Japan
received because ofits continued trade with apartheid South Africa during
the economic boycott. 5 However , these authors do not delve specifically
into why Japan-Africa relations have remained distant through time .
These authors neither specifically address the importance of the
international context on Japanese-African relations nor do they examine
how Japan ' s view of itself and its role in the world influence its
interactions with countries of the South such as those in Africa. Japan
since before it closed off its relations with nations of the West in the
seventeenth century has perceived its role in the world as a vulnerable yet
potentially powerful one . It has struggled to become a great power in
order to not be subsumed ~y the strong forces of Europe, the United
States, and China. Additionally , Japan has greatly influenced and altered ,
although not proactively, the dominant modes of thought about possible
successful paths to development prevalent in the world.
Africa's particular role in the global political and economic
structure also affects international relations and thought, particularly with

76

I The Journal of Political Science

Changing Dynamics
respect to alternative conceptions of the state, the nation, and economic
and political development. Africa is an area of the world which was first
ravaged by colonial division and dependency and then by civil and
regional wars and by international debt. It has been and remains tied to
the international system which utilizes its natural resources, supports or
overthrows its political leaders, and dictates structural adjustment
measures which often are not compatible with its history and present
political and economic systems. Africa and Japan have had different
experiences that are related to their interactions with the international
system created and led by the United States and Europe, but both areas
have been and continue to be strongly tied to this world system.
In order to examine the nature of Japan's interactions with
Africa, it is important to analyze both their direct interactions and their
indirect relations as affected by their dealings with the international
political and economic system, their world views, and their views of
themselves. These factors combined with the direct and indirect aspects
of Japanese-African relations begin to explain the reasons why Japan has
remained relatively inactive yet economically powerful in Africa.

The Cold War Framework
From directly after World War II until the mid- I 960's, relations
between Africa and Japan were almost nonexistent. Yet, this period is
still vital to the study of Japanese-African relations. The independence
and nationalist movements in Africa began to form the structure and
course of intra-African relations, relations with present and soon-to-beformer European imperial powers, and Africa's role in and perspective on
the world. In Japan, defeat in World War II, post-war occupation by the
United States, continuation of some of the pre-war attitudes towards the
world, and the push for postwar reconstruction combined in the
formulation of postwar Japanese foreign policy.
The drive for African independence and the resulting
postcolonial entities left Africa with the huge task of determining its
future course while attempting to deal with the colonial legacy. As
Europe and the United States became embroiled in the East-West battle
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of the Cold War, the power struggle had great effects on an Africa
pushing towards development. The demand in the West for inexpensive
primary commodities as well as strategic strongholds against the USSR
contributed greatly to the continuing political and economic instability of
many areas in the region. The establishment of the franc zone in the
former French colonies, keeping these countries tied to France, limited
their economic expansion. 6 Yet, for African economic and at points
political survival, these relations were often seen as necessary by African
entities . Often, African countries had little choice whether or not to
accept the aid and influence of countries which were so large militarily
and economically. 7
These events spurred several movements in Africa calling for
African continental or regional unity and independence from these still
overly influential former colonial powers . Yet, the struggle to survive
while attempting to stabilize their political and economic situations made
it difficult for Africa to close itself off from the pressures of the West.
Africa maintained commodity trade with the former colonial powers and
with the U.S. and received aid from these countries . For example, Sudan,
Somalia, Kenya, and Zaire (Congo) were considered key stronghold
countries aided by the West as bolsters against communism. The unstable
political situations and economic difficulties of these countries since
independence is well-known, and their roles as pawns in the Cold War
greatly contributed to this instability.
Japan's experience in dealing with the Cold War world held only
a few similarities to those of Africa. Japan was also greatly affected by
the Cold War power struggle. However, Japan was treated very
differently than Africa by the United States and Europe. Large amounts
of capital, goods, and technology flowed into the country while the United
States supplied it with military protection. Japan also oddly benefitted
both from the destruction of its infrastructure during World War II and
from the technology it had gained from its rapid prewar industrialization.
Both these factors enabled Japan to utilize capital given by the United
States to build a new, modem postwar infrastructure to establish a firm
foundation for rapid reindustrialization. The prewar oligarchical political
system also formed a hierarchical power structure which led the way to a
powerful postwar bureaucr-acyand dominant one-party legislative system.8
Beginning with the occupation of Japan by United States forces
after World War II, Japan started to forge a strong if not always cordial
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relationship with the U.S. Article IX in the post-World War II Japanese
constitution stipulates that Japan will not support a military and will not
participate in military activity abroad. As the Cold War intensified,
Japan's dependence on the United States for its defense shaped Japan's
relations with other countries along the lines of US and Western European
policy. 9 Particularly in its giving of aid, Japan took an anti-communist
strategic approach, concentrating its aid in countries allied with the US
and Western Europe without interfering with the policies of these powers
in the region.
This strategy worked until Japan grew so large economically that
the U.S. began to protest against its economic policies which limited free
trade. The U.S. often used the fact that the country was Japan's main
protector in the Cold War to attempt to impel Japan into opening its
economy to more imports. The push-pull relationship between the U.S.
and Japan further strengthened Japan's resolve to be as indirect in its
foreign policy making as possible so as to not incur the wrath of the
United States while at the same time dealing with countries which
possessed needed resource inputs or which had large import markets for
Japanese goods, particularly important after the oil shocks of 1973-74.
Japan's inactive foreign policy therefore enabled it to continue attaining
its defense from the U.S . while dealing with most countries in a mainly
economic manner.
Beginning in the late 1960's, as Japan ran large world trade
surpluses and became one of the richest countries in the world, Japan
showed its support of anticommunism by targeting its Official
Development Assistance (ODA) at anticommunist countries such as
Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Zaire, and Malawi. 10 Additionally, as
Japan continued to run large trade surpluses in Africa (see Tables 1 and
2) in the 1960's, several countries invoked Article 3 5 of GA TT and
imposed trade restrictions on Japan. In 1965, Kenya, Tanzania, and
Uganda, and Nigeria began to restrict Japanese imports.
Not
coincidentally, Japan began giving yen loans to Africa in 1966, with
Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda as recipients. 11
Through its mainly economic foreign policy in Africa, then,
Japan could secure natural resources and open markets to its products
without becoming embroiled in political conflicts in the region that might
bring it up against the policies of the Cold War powers of the U.S. and
Western Europe.
Volume 25, 1997 \

79

Rebecca Spyke
The international context at the beginning of the Cold War
contributed to the positions of both Africa and Japan in the world Cold
War hierarchy . Whereas Africa became a Cold War battleground
between East and West and a source of cheap commodity goods, Japan
became a vital outpost for U.S. troops and a noncommunist anchor for the
West in Asia as well as a source of cheap imports for the United States.
Japan also had the internal drive to develop as rapidly as possible to
become a powerful world player rather than be subsumed by the
confrontational world system. Its status as useful tool to the U.S. and its
complex bureaucratic governmental structure and drive to come back from
the defeat of war combined to push Japan into the role as economic
power .
However, as Japan became more economically powerful, it did
begin to assert some independence from the United States in the pursuit
of its own economic interests . This beginning of a separation from the
United States was reinforced by the oil crises of 1973-74, when Japan
realized that its dependence on other countries for vital resources meant
that another country ' s economic value to Japan was more important than
that country's alliance with the United States. Japan therefore quietly
increased trade and aid to some African countries which were not on the
best terms with the U.S. but which either possessed potentially
expandable export markets or had resources Japan could import cheaply,
illustrated by trade with Mozambique (see Table 1). Japan pursued these
economic relations quietly and apolitically, concentrating economic
interaction in a few African countries, and avoiding confrontation with
Western policies. Japan's sense of vulnerability and concentration on
gaining world economic power will be examined in the next section.
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Table 1: Japan's Trade with Four African Countries
1955-76 (millions of yen)
Za.ire

Exporu

Tanzania

Kenya

Imports

Exporu

lmporu

Exporu

Mozambique
lmporu

Exports

lmporu

19SS

1226

4S

168S

498

4611

1349

213

16S

1960

S87

1399

798S

3209

3332

3436

663

1394

196S

1871

1374

9236

1998

3S4S

1943

813199

3938

1970

IS,S48

13,S39

14,958

1679

7767

6504

13,282

8130

1971

22,S82

9390

17,063

2917

61S9

3202

13,068

8130

1972

14,852

83SS

14,341

3038

6S23

3S32

11,863

96SI

1973

13,813

22,1 IS

19,827

6600

11,612

4467

I0,70S

6601

1974

19,646

31,659

30,291

7842

20,3SI

S041

10,679

24,262

197S

11,180

17,764

21,292

7794

16,060

3132

7072

18,796

1976

9962

2S,632

29,97S

7026

22,39S

37S2

3960

10,633

source: Bureau of Statistics, Prime Minister's Office, Japan Statistical
Yearbook, 1975 and 1980.

Table 2: Japan's Foreie:nTrade by Area (billions of yen)
Year

Asia

Toi&!

South America

Africa

Exports

Imports

Export.,

Imports

Export.,

lmporu

Exports

Import.,

19SS

723

889

302

324

SJ

37

74

22

1960

1460

1617

S2S

493

64

S2

126

S9

196S

3043

2941

990

983

89

140

294

127

1969

S1S6

S408

9S1

16S0

173

273

41S

3S3

1970

6954

6797

2181

2009

214

JS!

Sl2

39S

1971

8392

6909

2483

23S4

286

312

719

347

1972

8806

7228

2491

2SOS

299

269

643

360

1973

10,031

10,404

3187

37S3

38S

3S6

8SO

41S

source: Bureau of Statistics, Japan Prime Minister's Office, Japan
Statistical Yearbook, 1975.
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World Views
There exists a drive within Japan to become as strong as possible
in order to be recognized as a powerful force in the world and to not be
victimized by other large countries. According to Seizaburo Sato, the
following principles have guided Japan's foreign policy for the past one
hundred years:
1. A strong sense of belonging to Japan and the Japanese race coupled
with deep-rooted feelings of inferiority;
2. Intense concern with improving the country's international status;
3. Deep anxiety over being isolated internationally;
4. Desire to conform to world trends;
5. Emotional commitment to Asia. 12
Japan's strong nationalism combined with its feelings of
international vulnerability and the perceived need to become strong
economically to survive have driven Japan to develop an economic system
which, although dependent on foreign sources of oil, coal, and other
resources, and which has grown so rapidly by concentrating on the
development ofhigh-quality, inexpensive exports, has remained relatively
closed to large amounts of noncommodity imports and foreign investment
in Japan. Japan could maintain such a system because of its authoritative
political culture and its usefulness to the United States during the Cold
War. The U.S., although the main force behind the rules of international
economic interactions as established in the Bretton Woods system, rarely
cried out against Japan's far from free trade markets . Japan was more
useful to the U.S. as a stable exporter of inexpensive goods than as an
economically undeveloped entity that could fall prey to the claws of the
communists .
As Shigeru Yoshida, one of the primary formulators of
contemporary Japanese foreign policy, writes in 1957,
...Japan clearly must feed its 90 million people through
trade. Given this, Japan's commercial ties naturally
and necessarily stress America and Britain, which are
the most economically affluent and technologically
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advanced countries, and those with which we
historically have the closest ties ... .It is simply the
fastest and most effective way to promote the interests
of the Japanese people. 13
Japan was driven to develop economically to quell its sense of
vulnerability and protect itself from the interests of the superpowers.
Japan ' s view of the world as a place where it must struggle to survive was
also part of the reason Japan supported the policies of the Western powers
without actively forming its own policies that might conflict with those of
its trading partners and defenders. Japan protects itself due to its
perceived vulnerability in the world system by maintaining an inactive
political policy and concentrating on developing its own economic
strength.
In contrast, although, as Nyong'o says, the colonial and Cold
Warlegacy in Africa have hindered many African countries from making
the state their own. 14 Several people in Africa have not merely sat back
and watched Africa crumble. Discussions and debates as to how to deal
with this continuing linkage with Europe and the United States, as well as
how to develop particularly African nonconfrontational and nondictatorial
economic and political systems, is_ongoing. From Marxist scholars such
as Samir Amin who call for Africa to form an alternative definition of the
nation-state not based on Western conceptions of bourgeois leadership
and the capitalist mode ofproduction 15 to Ali Mazrui ' s calls for Africa to
refind its own strong, unique history and base African political and
economic structures upon it 16 to calls for pan-African unity as a means of
forming a strong peaceful Africa, 17 scholars demonstrate the combination
of Africa's subjugation by the international system and the empowerment,
activism, and frustration that go along with lively, intense debate by
Africans about possible strategies for their future. The desire to rise up,
to change the unsatisfactory status quo, the disagreements about how a
particularly African development path can be created, are discussions that
were pursued intensely during the I 960's and l 970's and are still
discussed by many on the continent.
These African and Japanese perspectives also determined the
nature of the relations between these two entities at that time and
established the groundwork for what these relations were to become in the

Volume 25, 1997 \

83

Rebecca Spyke
future. However, Japan's continued booming economic growth combined
with the oil crises of the l 970's began a drive towards a somewhat more
active economic role in Africa. The oil crises of the early 1970's and the
resource nationalism exerted by developing countries at this time spurred
in Japan feelings of "resource danger" (shigenkikikan) and therefore
Japan began the drive to establish closer relations with primary
commodity exporters. The continued feelings of vulnerability in Japan
are demonstrated by Japan calling itself shigensh61wku, or "few natural
resources country ." 18 Japan depended on the world for its industrial
inputs and relied on its industrial outputs for maintenance of a strong
position in the world system. Its foreign policy towards developing
countries was based in this strategic need for natural resources.
Africa's options to limiting dependency on the European and
American economic and political core were small. Africa's place in the
international context as exporter of primary commodities could change
little due to Africa's limited access to technology and the relative
instability of the political systems and leaders in several African
countries. At the same time, several African countries, to protect
themselves against a new economic colonialism by newly-industrializing
countries, exercised their right under GATI article 35 to restrict imports,
and therefore exports to Africa from Japan were limited. 19 Although the
Lome Convention of I 975 banned the special trade rights established by
former colonial powers, several African countries continued to have de
facto tied relationships, particularly to France and Portugal. Therefore,
Japan perceived African markets as difficult to enter. 20
Additionally, economic ties with Africa have been concentrated
in a few countries. Japan has always felt shut out of the francophone and
lusophone countries, which continued to maintain nontariffbarriers even
after the 1975 Lome Convention. Japan has few Africa specialists who
are informed about these countries. Japan also concentrates its trade in
countries which have large internal markets or large amounts of natural
resources, like South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, and Zaire. Direct
investment in Africa makes up only two percent of Japan's foreign
investments, halfofwhich from 1951 to 1981 was concentrated in Liberia
to take advantage of its liberal tax and disclosure laws. The remaining
investments are split between manufacturing ventures in countries with
large domestic markets, like Kenya, South Africa, and Nigeria or in
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mining ventures in Niger, Zambia, Zaire, and Nigeria .21
Ninety percent of trade was concentrated in 11 countries: South
Africa,Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Zambia, Sudan, Liberia, Zimbabwe, Zaire,
Mauritania, and Tanzania. 22 Aid was also highly concentrated in a few
countries and geared towards Japanese strategic interests. Eight countries
received 70 percent of ODA from 1960 to 1990.23 Of these countries,
Zaire, Zambia, and Niger are major suppliers of raw materials such as
copper and uranium. In Madagascar, Japan has investments in the mining
of chromium ore and in fishing . Sudan is a potent source of chromium.
Kenya is pro-West, and imports ten times more Japanese goods than it
exports to Japan. Tanzania is not as rich as other African entities in
resources, but under Nyerere it represented the pan-Africanist opinion
which called for African states to join together to seek freedom from
dependency on the international economic and political system. By
establishing economic ties with both Kenya and Tanzania, Japan could
play both sides of the diplomatic fence, establishing alliances with
countries not necessatily cordial with the West, which was important to
Japan after the oil shocks in 1973-4. Japan maintained almost solely
economic relations with countries such as Tanzania to make sure that no
conflicts with the West were engendered.
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Table 3: Japanese Bilateral Aid (ODA) to Africa
(in millions of US dollars)

Year

Total ODA to
Africa

Share of Total
ODA(%)

1960-66

.73

2.0

1967-69

8.10

8.2

1969

3.77

1.1

1970

8.15

2.2

1971

12.38

2.9

1972

5.01

1.0

1973

18.49

2.4

1974

36 .23

4. 1

1975

58.82

6.9

1976

45.93

6.1

1977

56.25

6.3

1978

105.49

6.9

1979

186.72

9.7

1980

222.91

11.4

Source : Japanese Ministry ofForeignAffairs Diplomatic Bluebook, 1981;

DevelopmentAssistance,OECD-DAC, Paris, 1970
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Table 4. Sectoral Breakdown of Japanese ODA to Africa
(percentage of commitments)
Year

Social
Infrastructure

Economic
Infrastructure

Production
Sectors

Program
Assistance

--

1970

1.4

69.4

29.2

1971

2.1

15.4

20 .9

5.2

1972

2.9

20.4

21.7

5.5

1975

2.8

39.4

25 .3

1980

8.5

60.6

24.4

---

( 1) Social infrastructure includes education, health, population programs,
public development and planning services, etc.
(2) Economic infrastructure and services includes transport,
communications, river development, and energy.
(3) Production sectors include agriculture, industry, mining, construction,
manufacturing, trade, banking and tourism.
(4) Program aid includes structural adjustment programs and concentrated
country program assistance.

Source: OECD-DAC, Development Assistance, various reports, as
collected by Nelson Noel Messone, Japan's Foreign Aid to Africa:
International and Domestic Determinants Ph.D. dissertation, University
ofKentucky, 1994.

Building on the explanations given in the previous section,
Japan's historical experience, world view, and ties to the United States
and Europe propelled Japan to alleviate its fears of being cut off from
needed natural resources to purs~e mainly economic and quite distant
relations with Africa. Japan did not want to become involved in Africa's
political, national, and ethnic struggles. Japan served as a military outpost
for the United States and as an ally who almost always voted with the
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United States in international organizations such as the United Nations.
Japan also wanted to maintain a peaceful , unobtrusive position in the
world in order to avoid fears of its returned aggressiveness after the
events of World War II. It therefore rarely pursued a proactive foreign
policy, particularly in regions where powers such as Europe and the
United States were already active.

Japan's View of Itself
Japan has had little policy interaction with developing nations,
particularly with Africa. It concentrated its efforts on developing markets
in the industrialized nations. Japan had another reason for staying away
from the developing world . As Yoshida writes,
The Asian and African nations ...have relatively little
organic interdependence with the economies of other
countries ...their leaders are putting their main efforts
into politically and socially ridding these countries of
colonialism and dependency , not into fostering
economic relations with other countries. These leaders
want to avoid aligning with one side or the other in the
bipolar global setup and devote themselves to
marshaling the energies of their people for the task of
nation building. This might be termed passive
neutrality ....but their assertions of neutrality are not
based on any particular economic or military strength. 24
Japan had no interest in forming international relations with an
Africa which it felt was dealing with struggles in which Japan did not
want to participate. Japan had no need to take a stance in the struggle for
independence and nation formation occurring in Africa , for it was secure
in the strong ties and the military protection given to it by the United
States.
Another reason for distant relations with Africa is that Japan
feels much more affinity with the developed countries of the West than
developing countries of Africa or even Asia. As Yoshida wrote in 1957:
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Japan today is actually more Western than Asian with
respect to domestic politics, economics, industry, and
social affairs ....The Asian and African nations, by
contrast , are still backward societies with low living
standards and undeveloped industrial bases and
economies. 25
Related to Japan's world view, Japan considers itself more Western than
Eastern, more developed than developing . Not only does this view protect
Japan against being subsumed by large powers, for it pushes Japan to
continue in its quest for world power and strength although through
nonmilitary means, but it does go into a view of the Japanese nation as
something special, a country ~at is able to overcome the barriers of
development and become strong even after the huge defeat of World War
II. This view of the Japanese nation as unique and extraordinary has
fueled a hesitation to associate with developing countries that are unable
to help themselves to pull ahead. With the exception of aid to countries
suffering from famine or other disasters, Japan gives little aid to the
poorest countries of Africa 26 and maintains relatively distant diplomatic
relations with most countries of the continent. Japan's view of itself as
a special case, as a country different from those developing countries who
are unable to shine in the world system, has impelled it to s~e little
comn1onality with countries of the developing world .
Japan began intensive industrialization in the late l 800's during
the Meiji Era. The Japanese government was able to impel the Japanese
people to come together and sacrifice the freedom and luxuries they may
have otherwise been able to have for the sake of the nation's well-being .
The government could pursue this route to development for two reasons:
first, a large bureaucracy existed in Japan even during the Meiji Era that
was capable of constructing and pursuing development policies that may
have been politically hurtful to elected politicians . Japan was also run by
an oligarchical group of ministers headed by the Emperor, all of whom
were deeply respected in Japan and also were not elected officials.
Second, the Meijioligarchs perpetuated an ideology that, since Japan was
a small island nation that perceived itself as vulnerable to the whims of
the large powers, national strength and unity were vital to the nation's
health. 27 Japan succeeded in developing rapidly at this time, which
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reinforced the deep sense of nation that enabled the development to
succeed. Masao Maruyama , a respected Japanese academic, also explains
how this intense national pride fed Japan's fervid pursuit of victory during
World War 11.28
Although much has changed since World War II, the strong
Japanese sense of nation still existed in the 1960's and l 970's as did the
well-developed complex bureaucracy. Japan no longer had an Emperorled government, and Japan suffered greatly from its defeat in the war and
the humiliation of being occupied by the United States, yet Japan was still
a nation full of national pride and strength . Japan was able to use this
strong sense ofnation and its well-organized bureaucratic structure to aid
its second round of economic development, pushing Japan into the role
of great economic power at this time.29
Japan has had great indirect effect on the international structure
through its rapid growth utilizing an alternative development approach to
that used by the United States and Europe. Japan did not develop by
sticking to the free market capitalist principles espoused by the World
Bank and IMF. Instead, Japan protected its vital markets and used a
large, authoritative state apparatus to drive growth . Rather than focusing
on uniform economically-oriented policies such as interest and exchange
rate adjustment and the limiting of state spending, Japanese development
focused on an active, strong state role as the primary factor to economic
development and growth. 30 This focus in the literature on Japan is
interesting, for Japan's international role has mainly been economic, not
political, and yet its development concentrated on the political, an
authoritative state, ruling the economic . Japan has demonstrated that there
are many paths development, not just the route followed by the United
States and Europe. This reinforces Japan's sense of pride in itself.
The push to show the world that it was a powerful nation, that it
was strong enough to overcome the barriers to its development, meant that
Japan could see little commonality between itself and the nations of
Africa. These were countries which, as a famous Japanese developmental
economist says, cannot necessarily follow another country's model to
develop. 31 The countries must find their own way. Therefore, Japan
could justify its hesitation to become too close to the countries of Africa
by promoting a policy of self-help. This policy also kept Japan from
being too closely associated with the developing world, as Japan

lo
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considers itself a country as powerful and able as the countries of the
West.
In 1974, Japanese Foreign Minister Kimura made a visit to five
African countries (Ghana, Nigeria, Zaire, Tanzania, Egypt) and spoke
against colonialism (shokuminchishugihantai) and for African ethnic and
tribal freedom movements (minzokukaihoundo) . He supported what he
called economic Africanization and pledged that Japan would begin to
expand efforts to understand Africa as well as increase Japan's economic
cooperation to the region .32 However, little substantially changed in
Japan's policy towards Africa . Japan did begin giving Official
Development Assistance to the region and increased the amount of trade,
but political ties remained distant.
The main reason for this visit and expression of understanding
of Africa's causes is difficult to tell . Kimura's words may have been
mainly to ensure cordial relations between Japan and those countries that
could provide needed resources, at a time when African countries had
expressed dissatisfaction with Japanese economic policy in previous years
and sharply limited the amount of imports a}Jowed from Japan. Japan had
responded to previous import restrictions by increasing its foreign aid to
key countries in the region such as Nigeria, Zaire , Kenya, and Tanzania,
and not coincidentally, following this action and the oil shocks of 1973-4,
Foreign Minister Kimura visited Africa and spoke sympathetically about
Africa's concerns.
Japanese policy towards Africa remained unobtrusive and almost
solely economic in nature. Not only did Japan want to avoid being put in
a situation where it would need to formulate a more concrete, active
political foreign policy, but Japan was succeeding in attaining its goals
with the policy towards Africa it was maintaining at that time . Japan
could show the West that it was using its trade surplus not only for its
domestic benefit but was greatly increasing the economic assistance given
to developing countries . At the same time, Japan could establish its place
in the world system as the giver of aid, as a strong economic force on a
par with countries of the West, rather than a late-developing country with
more in common with Africa than with the West. Foreign aid not only
secured needed resources for Japan, but was a symbol that Japanese pride
in itself as a nation was warranted, for it was a powerful player in the
world economic system that was coming to the aid of the less developed
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world .33
African aid recipients were also looking towards their strategic
interests. These countries needed the funds which Japan was offering,
and, although much of the aid was tied to agreements to contract Japanese
companies to assist in the implementation of the project being funded, no
political ties were suggested . However , it cannot be said that African
countries viewed such non politically-tied aid with relief for many authors
see Japanese aid as a type of neo-mercantilism that would further bind
Africa to its role as international provider of natural commodities and
flood the continent with Japanese imports.34

Conclusion
The influence of the Cold War and colonial powers on Africa
and Japan , Japan ' s world view, and Japan ' s view of itself have
determined how Japan fonned policy towards Africa in the I 960's and
1970's. Japan's wish to remain allied with the U.S. and receive its
military protection and economic aid, its perceived need to remain strong
to prevent being subsumed by the world's powers, and its view of itself
as a unique country that had used its own special talents to become a great
economic power , have worked together to maintain distant relations
between Japan and Africa. Japan saw little in common with Africa and
wanted to refrain from becoming involved in African political conflicts
in which the Cold War powers were already embroiled.
Whether the economic relations that did exist between Japan and
Africa were mutually beneficial is debatable . Japan continued to run huge
surpluses in the region throughout the time period, taking away valuable
foreign exchange from Africa. Japan did provide substantial amounts of
aid to the region , although this aid was concentrated in few key countries
and was often tied to contracts with Japanese companies. Japan's refusal
to become involved in Africa ' s political problems also may have kept
Africa from having a powerful non-Western ally with enough economic
clout to help Africa against the whims of the U.S. and former colonial
powers .
Yet, Japan's distant relations with Africa may have been more
helpful to the region than previously thought. Japanese trade and aid with
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Africa did provide economic activity without more political policies being
imposed. Japan did mainly support Western allies in the region, and
therefore its trade and aid were indirectly politically motivated, but Japan
did not impose its own views on an Africa that was being pushed and
pulled in many political directions both internally and externally.
Whether Japan's relations with Africa were helpful or hurtful,
little changed in the context of the relations before or after the time period
examined . More has been mentioned in Japan about Africa after the Cold
War,as Japan is seeking a permanent seat on the United Nations Security
Council and has suffered even more criticism for its supposedly
mercantilist policies. However, due to the reasons previously mentioned,
Japan will probably never forge close relations with the nations of Africa.
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